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ABSTRACT 
Automated systems perform functions that were previously executed by a 
human. When using automation, the role of the human changes from operator to 
supervisor. For effective operation, the human must appropriately calibrate trust 
in the automated system. Improper trust leads to misuse and disuse of the 
system. The responsibilities of an automated system can be described by its 
level of automation. This study examined the effect of varying levels of 
automation and accuracy on trust calibration. 
Thirty participants were divided into three groups based on the system’s 
level of automation and provided with an automated identification system. Within 
the Virtual Battlespace 2 environment, participants controlled the video feed of an 
unmanned aircraft while they identified friendly and enemy personnel on the 
ground. Results indicate a significant difference in the ability to correctly identify 
targets between levels of automation and accuracy. Participants exhibited better 
calibration at the management by consent level of automation and at the lower 
accuracy level. These findings demonstrate the necessity of continued research 
in the field of automation trust. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The employment of automated systems is expanding across the modern 
battlefield. The growth of automation has not eliminated the human from the 
system; it has transformed the human’s role. With the trend toward increasing 
automation, human roles have changed from operators to supervisors. This 
change does not necessarily mean that human workload has been reduced. 
Instead, cognitive resources are applied to different tasks, such as anticipating 
the automation and understanding the actions of the automation. Nonetheless, 
highly automated systems will be critical for the supervision of multiple 
unmanned systems across the battlefield. The changing but continuous role that 
humans maintain with automated systems requires an understanding of the 
human-automation relationship. One aspect of this relationship that had yet to be 
explored was the process by which humans calibrate trust in automated systems.  
This study examined the calibration of trust at three levels of automation 
and two levels of accuracy. The levels of automation were decision support, 
management by consent, and management by exception. Accuracy of the 
automation was set at 75% and 90%. The experiment was a mixed design in 
which level of automation was a between subjects factor while accuracy was a 
within subjects factor. The experiment was conducted in the Human Systems 
Integration Laboratory at Naval Postgraduate School using Virtual Battlespace 2 
software. Thirty participants were tasked to identify enemy and friendly targets as 
the operator of a video feed from an unmanned aircraft. In support of the task, 
participants were given the assistance of an automated identification system. 
Participants were divided into three groups and provided with information about 
the responsibilities of the automation. The descriptions corresponded to one of 
three levels of automation listed above. 
The results of this study suggest that a system’s level of automation may 
influence an operator’s ability to calibrate trust. There was a statistically 
significant difference in the correct identification percentage between levels of 
 xiv
automation. When informed that a system was automated at the management by 
consent level, participants outperformed groups at the decision support and 
management by exception levels. Better performance may indicate better trust 
calibration, but not in the direction hypothesized. The accuracy of the automated 
system also influenced the correct identification percentage. Performance was 
better at the 90% accuracy level but a greater percentage of automation errors 
were identified at the 75% accuracy level. The difference was statistically 
significant. We hypothesized that trust calibration would decrease as accuracy 
decreased, but trust calibration appeared to increase as accuracy decreased. 
This study explored the process of trust calibration in automated systems. 
New automated systems are fielded regularly and the level of automation should 
be carefully considered early in system development. An understanding of the 
cognitive processes in play on a human-automation team is vital to the future 
integration of highly automated systems onto the battlefield. We must examine 
the manner in which humans build trust in automated systems and how trust 
relates to effective operation. The goal of future research should not be to divide 
the tasks between humans and machines; the efforts need to focus on how 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Automated systems are widely used in civilian and military applications. 
Examples can be as simple as the turn-by-turn directions available in a car’s 
global positioning system or as complex as the flight controls of unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS). According to Lee and See (2004), automation is 
technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes decisions or 
controls processes. The United States military has recognized the value of 
automation on the battlefield across the spectrum of military operations. By 
October 2006, coalition UASs had logged nearly 400,000 flight hours and 
unmanned ground vehicles had responded to more than 11,000 improvised 
explosive device situations (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007). An unmanned 
vehicle is a powered vehicle that does not carry a human operator, can be 
operated autonomously or remotely, can be expendable or recoverable and can 
carry a lethal or nonlethal payload (DoD, 2007). The need for unmanned systems 
continues to grow. Each year, Combatant Commanders submit an integrated 
priorities list of their theater’s capability gaps. In 2008, 17 of the top 99 prioritized 
gaps could have been addressed by unmanned systems, including 2 of the top 
10 (DoD, 2007).  
According to the United States Air Force (USAF) UAS Flight Plan 2009–
2047 (Department of the Air Force [DAF], 2009a), “Unmanned aircraft systems 
are one of the most “in demand” capabilities the USAF provides to the joint task 
force.” Part of the USAF vision in this document was to harness automated 
systems to maximize Joint Force combat capabilities. One of ten key 
assumptions in the UAS Flight Plan was that automation is vital to increasing 
effects and cutting costs. As technologies advance, automated systems will 
compress the time to observe, orient, decide, and act. This sequence of activities 
is commonly referred to as the OODA Loop. A UAS will interpret the situation and 
act with little or no human interaction. As automation becomes more 
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sophisticated the need for an operator will be reduced. However, automation 
does not replace humans in the system; it changes the nature of the task. Rather 
than operating a UAS, the human will supervise its actions. 
In a supervisory control environment, automation can be designed with 
varying levels of autonomy. In a highly automated system the computer makes 
all decisions and acts on its own. A minimally automated system might simply 
present the supervisor with options and defer to the supervisor to make the 
decision. Several classification systems to describe levels of automation have 
been proposed. Table 1 is the earliest description of levels of automation, 
developed by Sheridan and Verplank (1978). 




1 The computer offers no assistance: human must make all decisions & actions 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or 
3 narrows the selection down to a few, or 
4 suggests one alternative, and 
5 executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
6 allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 
7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs humans, and 
8 informs the human only if asked, or 
9 informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to. 
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human
 
The Combatant Commanders and Military Departments identified 
precision target location and designation as the number two capability need to be 
filled by UASs (DoD, 2007). Target identification and designation capability can 
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be supported with varying levels of automation. A system with Level 3 
automation might select the most likely targets for the supervisor to designate, 
while Level 6 automation would designate a target on its own, but give the 
supervisor an opportunity to veto the decision. 
Employing an automated target designator has some inherent risk; targets 
must be identified with a high degree of certainty. Unfortunately, a highly 
automated system is not equivalent to a highly accurate system. There are 
numerous examples of the failure to correctly use automation in the military. The 
USS Vincennes disaster in 1978, and the destruction of a British Tornado and 
American F/A-18 in 2004 with a Patriot missile system, are two examples (Fisher 
& Kingma, 2001; 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 2003).  
Highly automated decision aids are useful for rigid tasks, but they are not 
suited for decisions in dynamic environments. In dynamic situations, the 
automation may not be programmed to adapt, leading to a catastrophic failure for 
which the human supervisor is not prepared. For example, the DoD UAS 
Roadmap (2007) identifies the challenge of developing automation that considers 
rules of engagement. Not every situation is black and white; the supervisor must 
be capable of stepping in when the automation fails to interpret the gray areas. In 
automated systems, inability to adapt to novel situations is known as the 
“brittleness problem” (Guerlain & Bullemer, 1996; Guerlain, 1995). 
Automation is often sold as a solution to reduce operator workload and 
enhance situational awareness. The USAF views any implementation of 
automation in the near future as a tool to decrease workload (DAF, 2009a). The 
assumption is that human and automation teams perform better than a human 
alone. Some research has shown that automation can improve performance in 
rigid situations requiring little flexibility in decision making (Endsley & Kaber, 
1999). However, other research has shown that human operators often make 
errors through misuse or disuse of automated aids (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Misuse occurs when an operator over relies on an automated aid. The authors 
cite the crash of Eastern Flight 401 into the Florida Everglades as an example of 
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misuse. The crew did not realize the autopilot had disengaged and failed to 
monitor altitude, allowing the airliner to crash. Disuse is the under reliance on 
automation. Whenever an individual ignores an alarm, the system is being 
disused. 
Simply improving the reliability of an automated aid will not lead to 
appropriate automation reliance or increase the overall performance of the 
human-automation team. Sorkin and Woods (1985) demonstrated that a more 
reliable automated aid did not lead to the best overall performance. The 
supervisor and automation work as a team and the operator must determine the 
appropriate circumstances to rely on automation. One of the factors known to 
influence a supervisor’s decision to rely on automation is trust. Trust is the 
attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation 
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability (Lee & See, 2004). However, trust 
alone is not enough to ensure appropriate reliance. An optimally automated 
system with high detection rates and low false alarm rates may seem more 
trustworthy, but the supervisor must know when to trust the system and when not 
to trust the system. Inappropriate levels of trust result in disuse or misuse of an 
automated aid.  Overreliance or misuse occurs when the supervisor trusts an 
automated aid that is less reliable than manual operation. Distrusting an 
automated aid that is more reliable than manual operation leads to under-
reliance or disuse. 
Since errors in the level of trust in self—and trust in automation—lead to 
misuse and disuse, it is important that supervisors appropriately calibrate their 
trust. Calibration is the correspondence between a person’s perception of the 
reliability of an agent and the true reliability of that agent (van Dongen & van 
Maanen, 2006). In order to achieve the best performance, supervisors of 
unmanned systems must be capable of calibrating trust in the system. 
Appropriate calibration results in decreased misuse and disuse of automated 
systems.  
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Accurate calibration is crucial in a military environment where operators 
must make quick decisions while relying on the guidance of automated aids. We 
must understand the process by which operators calibrate their trust in 
automation. Though the concept of trust in automation has been thoroughly 
researched, there are some topics remaining to be addressed. For one, 
researchers have yet to examine how trust is calibrated with specific levels of 
automation. The current study investigated how levels of automation impact an 
operator’s ability to calibrate trust in the system. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This research explored how operator performance was affected by a 
system’s level of automation and accuracy. Specifically, this study: 
 Assessed the ability of the human operator to calibrate trust at 
varying levels of automation 
 Assessed the ability of the human operator to calibrate trust at 
varying automation accuracy levels 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How do we measure trust calibration? 
 Is the ability to accurately calibrate trust associated with level of 
automation? 
 Is the ability to accurately calibrate trust associated with automation 
accuracy? 
D. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
The human plays a central role in every weapons system. Manned or 
unmanned, there will always be some type of interaction between the system and 
the human. The Naval Postgraduate School (2010) describes HSI as follows: 
Human Systems Integration (HSI) acknowledges that the human is 
a critical component in any complex system. It is an interdisciplinary 
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approach that makes explicit the underlying tradeoffs across the 
HSI domains, facilitating optimization of total system performance. 
By following the principles of HSI, practitioners can optimize total system 
performance across the system’s lifecycle. Simply recognizing the role of the 
human in the system is just the first step toward performance optimization. The 
integration of the human into the system must be approached from multiple 
domains. The HSI domains are: 
 Human Factors Engineering 
 Human Survivability 
 Health Hazards 





The true HSI process occurs when the HSI practitioner defines the human 
requirements in each of these domains and considers the tradeoffs that must 
occur. Tradeoffs among the HSI domains create a balance among cost, schedule 
and technical performance parameters. This is how total system performance is 
optimized. 
Three of the HSI domains are particularly relevant to the present study; 
human factors engineering, training, and personnel. Human factors engineering 
“involves the understanding and comprehensive integration of human capabilities 
into system design” (DAF, 2009b). Human factors engineers integrate cognitive, 
physical, sensory, social capabilities to create human-systems interfaces in 
support of operation, maintenance, support and sustainment. According to 
Wickens, Lee, Liu, and Becker (2004), the goal of human factors is to design 
 7
systems that enhance performance, increase safety, and increase user 
satisfaction. In the context of the present study, an understanding of the human’s 
interaction with automation can influence the design of interfaces that support 
optimal performance. The ability to accurately calibrate trust could decrease the 
disuse and misuse of automated systems. Proper use of the system is directly 
related to performance, safety, and user satisfaction. 
Training, “encompasses the instruction and resources required to provide 
personnel with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly operate, 
maintain, and support systems” (DAF, 2009b). According to the Defense 
Acquisition University, training program design uses “analyses, methods, and 
tools to ensure systems training requirements are fully addressed and 
documented by systems designers and developers to achieve a level of 
individual and team proficiency that is required to successfully accomplish tasks 
and missions” (Defense Acquisition University, 2011). The HSI practitioner must 
determine who needs instruction, what to teach them, and how to provide the 
instruction. The results of the present study can influence training program 
design for unmanned vehicle operators. Understanding the complexities of trust 
calibration can change the who, what, and how of training program design. 
HSI practitioners working in the personnel domain consider the “total 
human characteristics and skill requirements for a system to support full 
operational capabilities necessary to operate, maintain, and support a system” 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2011). The knowledge, skills, abilities and 
aptitudes translate directly to personnel requirements and methods to recruit, test 
and select personnel. The personnel selected for a system influence training, 
manpower, and design requirements. The results of the present study will 
support HSI practitioners attempting to define knowledge, skill, ability, and 
aptitude requirements for unmanned vehicle operators. 
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E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II provides a review of the 
relevant literature regarding levels of automation, trust, and calibration. Chapter 
III describes the method used to conduct the experiment. The discussion 
includes details regarding participants, materials, variables, and procedures. 
Chapter IV is a report of the results of the experiment. The thesis ends with a 
discussion of conclusions that can be drawn from the results, as well as 
recommendations for follow-on research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This literature review is divided into three sections. It begins with a 
discussion of levels of automation. The second section describes the concept of 
trust in automation. The third section concludes the literature review with an 
examination of the process of trust calibration. 
B. LEVELS OF AUTOMATION 
Unmanned systems have the capacity to execute actions that previously 
required a human to complete. Functions now allocated to unmanned systems 
include tasks that humans do not wish to perform or cannot perform as 
accurately or reliably (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Researchers 
have devoted a great deal of effort to determine just what tasks machines 
perform more accurately and reliably. The challenge of allocating functions to 
humans and machines has led researchers to ask, “What can humans do better 
than machines?” The earliest attempt to divide responsibility between humans 
and machines resulted in Fitts’ List (Fitts, 1951). The list, also known as MABA-
MABA, describes tasks that men are better at performing and tasks that 










Table 2.   Fitts’ List (From Fitts, 1951) 
Men Are Better At 
   Detection of small amounts of sensory information. 
   Perception of patterns. 
   Improvisation and flexibility of procedures. 
   Exercising judgment. 
   Recall of relevant information at the appropriate moment. 
   Performing inductive reasoning. 
Machines Are Better At 
   Rapid response to data. 
   Application of great force smoothly and precisely. 
   Executing repetitive, routine functions. 
   Performing deductive reasoning and computations. 
   Brief storage of information for immediate use. 
   Execution of multiple tasks simultaneously. 
 
Fitts’ List served as a starting point to describe the division of labor 
between humans and machines. However, the list does not describe the division 
of responsibility when humans and machines work together. Humans rely on 
automated systems to perform tasks that machines are better at performing. A 
device that accomplishes a function that was previously carried out by a human 
operator is an automated system (Parasuraman et al., 2000). While automation 
is required to replace tasks previously performed by humans, the capabilities and 
responsibilities of automation are not equal. Automation is not an all or none 
quality; tasks may be partially or completely controlled by the automated system. 
Highly automated systems are granted greater control over tasks and require 
less human interaction.  
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Simply describing a system as highly automated does not convey 
sufficient information about the capabilities of the automation. The construct of 
levels of automation was developed to serve as a more precise description of an 
automated system’s capabilities and the requirements of the human operator. 
The earliest description of the levels of automation appeared in a technical report 
to the Office of Naval Research written by Sheridan and Verplank (1978). The 
authors developed a model to describe the division of responsibility between 
humans and automation. High level of automation corresponded with greater 
automation responsibility. Ten levels of automation were defined. Level 1, a 
completely manual task, had the least automation and Level 10, a completely 
computer controlled task, had the most automation.  
Sheridan and Verplank’s model for human automation interaction was 
followed by several similar models. Rouse and Rouse (1983) proposed three 
levels of automation to describe the human-automation relationship. Manual 
control, Sheridan and Verplank’s first level, was described as dormant 
automation. The system remains inactive unless initiated by the operator. 
Management-by-consent was equivalent to Level 5 in Sheridan and Verplank’s 
model. At this level, automation proposes action but cannot act without approval 
by the operator. The third level, management-by-exception, was parallel to 
Sheridan and Verplank’s Level 6 in which automation will act unless explicitly 
directed not to by the operator. While the levels described by Rouse and Rouse 
could be mapped to similar descriptions in Sheridan and Verplank’s model there 
were several gaps. Notably, Rouse and Rouse did not include Levels 2, 3, and 4 
in which the automation provides suggestions to the operator. In addition, they 
excluded Levels 7–10 in which the automation acts without input from the 
operator.  
Endsley (1987) developed a level of automation hierarchy to specifically 
describe expert decision aid systems. Many aspects of Sheridan and Verplank’s 
model were incorporated into the new hierarchy. Notably, Levels 2, 3, and 4 were 
combined into a single level called “Decision Support.” This removed the 
 12
distinction between multiple alternatives, few alternatives and a single decision 
option. In addition, the author removed levels seven, eight, and nine from the 
earlier model, eliminating the description of how the system provides feedback to 
the operator. The changes made by Endsley resulted in a five level hierarchy: 
1. Manual Control—No assistance from the system 
2. Decision Support—Operator receives recommendations from the 
system 
3. Consensual Artificial Intelligence—System performs task if operator 
consents 
4. Monitored Artificial Intelligence—System performs task unless 
operator vetoes 
5. Full Automation—No operator interaction 
A more recent scale of human automation interaction was presented by 
Sheridan (2002, p 53) as a simplification of the original model. The model still 
retains the original format, describing the role of the computer and the human at 
each level. However, two levels have been removed from the earlier model. 
Levels 2 and 3 were combined to do away with the distinction between a system 
that presents a complete list of alternatives and a system that provides a narrow 
selection. The second change was the removal of Level 9, the level at which the 
system informs the operator only if the automation deems it necessary. The 
remainder of the scale of degrees of automation was unchanged. The revised 







Table 3.   Revised Scale of Degrees of Automation (From Sheridan, 2002) 
A Scale of Degrees of Automation 
1. The computer offers no assistance: human must do it all. 
2. The computer suggests alternative ways to do the task 
3. The computer suggests one way to do the task AND 
4. …executes that suggestion if the human approves, OR 
5. …allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, OR 
6. …executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, OR 
7. …executes automatically, and then informs the human only if asked. 
8. The computer selects the method, executes the task, and ignores the human. 
 
Careful examination of the various scales of automation reveals 
similarities. For one, each scale includes a management by consent and 
management by exception level. Management by consent is the level of 
automation at which the system suggests a solution and will act on that solution 
with the consent of the human (Rouse & Rouse, 1983). On Sheridan’s (2002) 
scale, it falls under Level 4 and is also referred to as consensual artificial 
intelligence by Endsley (1987). Management by exception is the level of 
automation at which the system selects a solution and allows the human time to 
veto the action before it is automatically executed (Rouse & Rouse, 1983). 
Management by exception corresponds with Level 5 on Sheridan’s (2002) scale; 
Endsley (1987) calls this monitored artificial intelligence. There is also some 
agreement about the level that Endsley calls decision support. Both Sheridan’s 
(2002) scale of degrees of automation and Sheridan and Verplank’s (1978) levels 
of automation include a level at which the automation simply provides 
recommendations for the operator. However, Rouse and Rouse (1983) did not 
include this level in their description. 
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Level of automation describes the division of responsibility between a 
human and an automated system. However, the level of automation does not 
describe how operators use and perceive the system. Regardless of the level of 
automation, operators must develop trust in the system. Mistrusted automated 
systems will used inappropriately and ineffectively.  
C. TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
Trust is a critical component in the interaction between humans and 
machines. Interest in trust began as an examination of human-human trust. In 
this context, trust has been defined as “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998). 
While this definition is accepted, trust has been difficult to define with a single 
statement. Barber (1983) described trust as a combination of three expectations: 
1) natural and moral laws will persist; 2) those we interact with are technically 
competent; and 3) those we interact with will carry out their fiduciary 
responsibility. Persistence, competency, and fiduciary responsibility together are 
the building blocks of trust. We must also consider the dynamics of trust, or how 
our perceptions of persistence, competency, and fiduciary responsibility are 
developed. Rempel et al. (1985) proposed that trust is a dynamic expectation 
and follows a developmental sequence based on predictability, dependability and 
faith. Early in a relationship trust is based on predictability, which is a result of 
consistent behavior. As time goes on dependability will become the dominant 
factor in trust. Specific behaviors become less important than a stable disposition 
in times of risk or vulnerability. The final stage of trust development is faith. 
Individuals look at past predictability and dependability then form expectations of 
behavior for future situations. 
Human-automation researchers saw trust as a significant factor 
influencing overall performance. When attempting to define trust in automation, 
researchers drew parallels from sociological studies of human-human 
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interactions. Just like interpersonal relationships, humans and machines form a 
dyad in which trust is a significant factor of performance.  Muir (1987) was among 
the first to consider trust in the man-machine domain. She developed a two-
dimensional framework for studying trust that was a cross of the components of 
trust and the dynamic formation of trust (Table 4).  Muir viewed persistence, 
competency, and responsibility as the most complete characterization of the 
components of trust, while trust was formed by predictability, dependability and 
faith.  Muir (1994) proposed a model for trust in human-automation relationships 
in which humans compare their perceptions of persistence, competence and 
responsibility with their expectations. The product of the comparison between 
perceived performance and expected performance is trust. 
Table 4.   Basis of expectation (From Muir, 1987) 
    Basis of Expectation At Different Levels of Experience 
Expectation   
Predictability       
(of acts) 
Dependability         
(of dispositions) 
Faith                         
(in motives) 
Persistence     
       Natural Physical 
 
Events conform 
to natural laws 
Nature is lawful Natural laws are 
constant 
       Natural Biological 
 
Human life has 
survived 
Human survival is 
lawful 
Human life will 
survive 











continue to be 
'good' and 'decent' 
in the future 
Technical Competence 
 
j's behavior is 
predictable 
j has a 
dependable nature 
j will continue to be 




j's behavior is 
consistently 
responsible 
j has a responsible 
nature 
j will continue to be 




One of the earliest studies of trust in a human-machine system was 
performed by Lee and Moray (1992), as an extension of a study performed by 
Muir (1989).  The purpose of the experiment was to develop a better 
understanding of human machine-trust. In this experiment, participants were 
asked to balance safety and performance while in control of a simulated 
pasteurization plant. The operators could vary control of the system from manual 
control, automatic control or mixed control throughout the experiment. A total of 
60 trials were performed by each participant and they completed a trust 
questionnaire after each trial. The questions established the operator’s subjective 
feelings about predictability, dependability, and faith in the automation. The 
results of this experiment suggested that reliance on an automated aid is not 
simply dependent on the perceived trustworthiness of the aid, but also the 
operator’s self confidence.  
Research has demonstrated that human-automation teams may exhibit 
less than optimal performance (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Human-only teams 
also demonstrate suboptimal performance. In the sociology community this poor 
performance is referred to as process loss. Poor performance has been 
attributed to cognitive, motivational, and social factors (Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 
1991). Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (1999) applied the aspects of process 
loss to human-machine teams to develop a broad model of automation use. 
While Muir (1994) considered only cognitive factors, Dzindolet et al. (1999) 
incorporated cognitive, motivational, and social factors. The manner in which 
humans process information from an automated aid is the cognitive process. 
Mosier and Skitka (1996) have defined reliance on an automated aid in a 
heuristic manner as automation bias. The human is subject to motivational 
processes as part of a human-machine team. In a sociological context, 
responsibility for the end product is diffused amongst team members. This may 
lead to the human on a human-automation team feeling reduced responsibility for 
the task and inappropriate reliance on the automated aid. The concept of social 
process built on the work of Lee and Moray (1992, 1994) when they found the 
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decision to rely on automation is dependent on trust in the aid and operator self 
confidence. The comparison between perceived reliability of the aid and 
perceived reliability of manual control is known as perceived utility. The 
perceived utility of the automated aid along with automation bias directly 
contribute to the operator’s relative trust. The complete model for automation use 
is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.   Model for Automation Use (From Dzindolet et al., 1999) 
Dzindolet et al. (1999) performed numerous experiments to test the 
propositions of their new model. Over the course of several studies, participants 
were presented with photographs of Fort Sill, Oklahoma and asked to perform a 
visual detection task. Half of the images contained soldiers in camouflage and 
participants identified the soldier in images while using an “automated” contrast 
detection aid with varying levels of accuracy. Cognitive processes were 
controlled by presenting the automation’s decision after the operator’s decision 
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had been made. Motivational processes were controlled by setting the level of 
effort required to use the automation equal to the effort without automation. The 
authors measured participants’ decision to rely on automation. Over the course 
of four experiments, the authors supported the prediction that automation use is 
determined by perceived utility of the aid, which is a result of a comparison 
between operator and aid performance. 
Reliance on a system is not simply dependent on trust. Operators decide 
when to rely on an automated system through a comparison of their own 
perceived reliability and the perceived reliability of the automated aid. This 
comparison leads to the development of relative trust, which feeds into 
automation use. The process of developing relative trust in a system is referred 
to as trust calibration. 
D.  TRUST CALIBRATION 
The comparison between trust in self and trust in automation is closely 
related to calibration of trust. Muir (1987) describes calibration as the user setting 
his or her trust level in correspondence with the machine’s trustworthiness and 
using the machine accordingly. The properly calibrated operator knows when to 
rely on the automated system (e.g., appropriate trust) and when to rely on 
manual control (e.g., appropriate distrust) (Muir, 1994). The improperly calibrated 
operator exhibits false trust when relying on poor automation and false distrust 
when discounting good automation. In the context of Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck and 
Dawe’s (2001) framework to predict automation use, calibration falls between the 
cognitive and social processes; it is the perceived utility of the automated aid. 
Lee and Moray (1992) encountered evidence of trust calibration in the 
course of their simulation of a pasteurization factory. Participants in the 
experiment were tasked as operators of the factory to optimize system output by 
controlling several processes. Operators were allowed to adopt manual control, 
automated control, or mixed control strategies. As the experiment progressed, 
the simulation was programmed to produce errors resulting in reduced system 
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performance. For the majority of the experiment, operators demonstrated a 
tendency to rely more heavily on manual control. Unexpectedly, chronic faults led 
to increased reliance on the automated aid even though trust in the automated 
aid decreased. Operator’s confidence in their own abilities decreased as well. 
The authors concluded trust was a factor in automation reliance, but self 
confidence in manual control abilities also contributed.  
Calibration is critical to the appropriate reliance on automated systems. 
Inappropriate reliance on automated aids is synonymous with misuse or disuse 
of that aid (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Misuse of an automated aid occurs 
when the operator incorrectly relies on automated control over manual control. In 
this situation, perceived utility of the automated aid is too high. High perceived 
utility stems from inflated perception of automation reliability and/or deflated 
perception of operator reliability. Disuse occurs when perception of automation 
reliability is deflated and/or perception of operator reliability is inflated. As a 
result, the operator may incorrectly rely on manual control over automated 
control. 
Another study examined how operators estimate their own reliability and 
the reliability of decision aids (Dongen & Maanen, 2006). The authors 
hypothesized that underestimation of decision aid reliability is more prevalent 
than underestimation of self reliability. In the course of the experiment 
participants were asked to estimate reliability of a decision aid and self reliability 
on a prediction task involving a sequence of numbers. The results of the 
experiment support the hypothesis that underestimation of the decision aid was 
more prevalent than self underestimation. In addition, they found that under-trust 
in own performance decreased over time, while under-trust of the decision aid 
persisted. 
The perceived reliability of an automated aid is should be dependent on 
the aid’s actual reliability. One framework for automation utilization assumes that 
operators initially expect automated aids to perform at near perfect rates, referred 
to as automation bias. As a result, errors by automation are particularly salient to 
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operators; this leads them to underestimate system reliability (Dzindolet et al., 
2001). Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang (2001) performed an experiment to examine 
the relationship between actual and perceived reliability. The participants were 
presented with automated diagnostic aids of varying reliability. The three 
conditions were 60% reliable increasing to 80% reliable, constant 80% reliability, 
and 100% reliable decreasing to 80% reliable. Participants were asked to 
estimate the reliability of the aid at the completion of the trials. Results suggested 
that operators of automated decision aids are sensitive to changing levels of aid 
reliability. In addition, this study supported the framework of cognitive and social 
processes affecting automation use developed by Dzindolet et al. (2001). 
Perceived utility of the automation was lower than automation reliance, 
suggesting the interference of social processes. 
One approach to measuring trust calibration is grounded in the principles 
of signal detection theory (Tanner & Swets, 1954). Generally, signal detection 
theory is a comparison between the true state and the perceived state. The 
operator’s response results in a hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection. When 
applying signal detection theory to trust calibration there are three components to 
consider:  the true state of the environment, the recommendation of the 
automation, and the response of the decision maker. In this scenario, the 
decision maker is unable to fully perceive the true state of the environment, or 
there is uncertainty in his perceptions. The automated system aids the operator 
by providing an interpretation of the state of the environment. Figure 2 depicts 
the relationship between ground truth, automation, and the decision maker. The 
human must make a choice by performing a comparison between the information 
provided by the automation and his own perceptions. 
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Figure 2.   Relationship between ground truth, automation, and decision maker 
Hits and correct rejections can occur when the operator appropriately 
agrees with or rejects the guidance of the automated aid. False alarms and 
misses are the result of misuse or disuse of the automated aid. An operator that 
is perfectly calibrated will know when to agree with the automated aid and when 
to disagree. Proper calibration is indicated by a high degree of hits and correct 
rejections. On the other hand, a high degree of misses and false alarms indicates 
poor calibration. The properly calibrated operator of an automated system should 
use the system as a tool to perceive the true state of the world, knowing when to 
accept or reject the system’s indications and achieve a high rate of hits and 
correct rejections.  
E. PRESENT STUDY 
Designers of unmanned systems grapple with questions about level of 
automation and accuracy today. From an HSI standpoint, knowledge about the 
human-automation relationship can influence human factors, training, and 
personnel. The present study examines the effects of changes to the level of 
automation and accuracy of automated systems. It is hypothesized that 
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increasing level of automation will decrease the operator’s ability to calibrate 
trust. In addition, decreasing accuracy of the automation will decrease the 
operator’s ability to calibrate trust. This section describes the manner in which 
these hypotheses were derived. 
A few researchers have explored the relationship between trust and levels 
of automation. Ruff, Narayanan, and Draper (2002) measured operator trust and 
correct detection of decision aid failure when controlling unmanned aircraft at 
varying levels of automation. The authors selected the Rouse and Rouse (1983) 
levels of automation: manual control, management by consent, and management 
by exception. In this experiment, operators were tasked to control one to four 
unmanned aircraft in a virtual environment as they searched for and engaged 
four ground targets. The automation provided decision aiding to the operator for 
changes in system state. At the completion of the experiment, participants were 
asked to rate their trust in the automated system, using subjective ratings based 
on the work of Masalonis and Parasuraman (1999). Results indicated that even a 
5% error rate led to a significant drop in trust at higher automation levels. In 
addition, correct rejections were significantly lower at the management-by-
exception level and this level consistently received the lowest trust ratings. The 
authors recommend that high levels of automation do not necessarily result in 
better performance. In some situations, optimal performance may be achieved 
with lower levels of automation. 
Levels of automation are an effective way to describe the division of 
responsibilities in a human-automation team. Researchers have proposed 
differing automation level classification systems. Ruff et al. (2002) selected 
Rouse and Rouse’s (1983) description of the levels of automation for their study. 
Similarities and differences among the classification systems were discussed 
earlier. The present study considers the similarities among classification systems 
and uses three levels of automation for examination: decision support, 
management by consent, and management by exception.  
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The study by Ruff et al. (2002) explored trust in levels of automation and 
the occurrence of correct detections of automation aid failure, but an area that 
has not been fully examined is the process of calibrating trust in automation. In 
the study by Ruff et al. (2002), correct detection of automation failures was 
recorded as a total for the entire trial. However, the process of calibration occurs 
over time, the operator must be provided feedback at regular intervals in order to 
refine his/her perception of the automation’s reliability. In the present study, 
calibration is measured using the framework of signal detection theory. If 
calibration improves over time, it will be indicated by an increased degree of hits 
and correct rejections. 
The accuracy of the automation impacts the operator’s perception of 
reliability. Ruff et al. (2002) used two levels of accuracy in their study, 100% and 
95%. They found that just that small change led to decreased trust in the 
automation. One thing they could not measure was how changing accuracy 
effected the operator’s ability to detect errors and calibrate trust. The present 









A. METHOD OVERVIEW 
The experiment consisted of a series of target detection tasks at varying 
levels of automation and accuracy. In the scenario, participants acted as the 
observer of a video feed from an unmanned aircraft. Their task was to identify 
enemy and friendly personnel as the unmanned aircraft flew along a scripted 
flight path. Each participant completed three trial runs containing 50 enemy 
targets and 50 friendly targets. 
The study incorporated a mixed design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three experimental groups (between subjects; decision 
support, management by consent, or management by exception). Each group 
experienced two levels of automation accuracy (within subjects; 75% and 90%). 
After completion of a manual control trial with no automated guidance, the 
participants were informed that they would be aided in subsequent trials by an 
automated identification system. The description of the automated system was 
consistent with a specific level of automation. In reality, the automated 
identification system did not exist. Instead, targets were identified by the 
experimenters as part of the scripted scenario. The same targets were identified 
as enemy and friendly at each automation level. Accuracy of the automation was 




The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board reviewed and 
approved the design of this study, in accordance with Department of the Navy 
and American Psychological Association standards. All participants provided 
informed consent by signing a form that notified them of their rights as 
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participants in the experiment. Participants were solicited through e-mail 
communication and personal contact. The study used a convenience sample 
taken from the Naval Postgraduate School population. 
2. Demographic Make-up 
Thirty participants (average age = 30.83, SD = 4.25 years) completed this 
study, 21 were male and nine were female. Participants were drawn from every 
United States military branch. In addition, several foreign military officers and 
civilians participated in the study. See Figure 3 to view the distribution of 
participants. 
 
Figure 3.   Distribution of Participants 
Participants who were members of the military provided their time in 






Figure 4.   Total Years of Military Service 
C. MATERIALS 
1. Virtual Battle Space 2 
Virtual Battlespace 2 is software that provides battlefield simulations. It 
was specifically designed by Bohemia Interactive for federal, state, and local 
government agencies. Primary uses of the software include training of doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for squad and platoon operations.  
2. Equipment 
The experiment was run on a Dell Precision M6300 laptop computer with 
the following specifications:  
 Attached Monitor: 24 inch Dell Flat Panel LCD Display 
 Operating System: Microsoft Windows XP 
 Processor: Intel Core 2 Duo T9500 @ 2.60 GHz 
 777 MHz, 3.5 GB of RAM   
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D. VARIABLES 
1. Independent Variables 
a. Level of Automation 
Group A was informed that the automated identification system 
functioned at the level of automation corresponding to decision support. The 
automation identified potential friendly and enemy targets, and the operator used 
the information to make a decision. 
Group B was informed that the automated identification system 
functioned at the level of automation corresponding to management by consent. 
The automation identified friendly and enemy targets and was prepared to act 
with consent of the operator. 
Group C was informed that the automated identification system 
functioned at the level of automation corresponding to management by 
exception. The automation identified friendly and enemy targets and would act 
unless the operator vetoed. 
b. Accuracy 
The automated identification system operated at two levels of 
accuracy, Level 1 was set at 75% and Level 2 was set at 90%. Accuracy 
describes the number of friendly and enemy targets correctly identified. This was 
a within subjects variable, each participant completed a trial at 75% and 90% 
accuracy. Accuracy was counterbalanced so that half of the participants in each 
group experienced 75% accuracy first and half of the participants experienced 
90% accuracy first.  
2. Dependent Variables 
There were three dependent variables: calibration, perceived reliability, 
and perceived utility. The number of friendly and enemy targets correctly 
identified by the participant measured calibration. Perceived reliability was  
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measured by responses to post-trial questionnaire Item 1. Perceived utility was 
measure by responses to post-trial questionnaire Item 2. See Appendix A for a 
copy of the post trial questionnaire. 
E. PROCEDURE 
Participants signed up for an hour-long experimental session as their 
schedules allowed. A single participant was tested during each session. The 
researcher distributed participants among the groups (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, & C2) 
in the order they volunteered. The first participant was placed in Group A1, the 
second in A2, the third in B1, and so on. Participants met the researcher in the 
Human Systems Integration Laboratory. Upon completion of the Informed 
Consent documentation participants answered a demographic questionnaire 
(Appendix B). 
Next, participants were provided with the initial scenario description. The 
description contained instructions for the participant, images of the targets, and 
the evaluation method. Participants were asked to summarize the directions to 
ensure accurate understanding of the task.  The instructions read: 
There has been a recent increase in terrorist activities along a road 
of strategic importance. Little is known about the position of enemy 
and friendly personnel along the roadway. In order to collect 
intelligence on the disposition of forces an unmanned aircraft has 
been directed to scout the roadway. You are the operator of the 
unmanned aircraft video feed. The aircraft will fly a programmed 
route over the roadway while you manipulate the camera. When 
you encounter an enemy along the route press the key labeled E to 
indicate an enemy, the target will be destroyed when the aircraft 
has passed. When you encounter friendlies along the route, press 
the key labeled “F” to keep them safe from engagement. 
The targets were placed along the flight path of the unmanned aircraft by 
the researchers. Three unique flight paths were programmed in Virtual 
Battlespace 2. An experimental trial was concluded when the aircraft flew a 
complete flight path. Participants completed three experimental trials without 
repeating flight paths. The Virtual Battlespace 2 mission editor provided a list of 
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targets from which the enemy and friendly personnel were chosen. The targets 
were selected to make accurate identification a challenge for the participants. 
Images of the targets are shown in Figure 5. 
   
Figure 5.   Enemy (left) and Friendly (right) targets. 
The scenario description also included an explanation of the evaluation 
method. Performance was assessed by the number of hits, misses, false alarms, 
and correct rejections. Participants were provided with the following definitions: 
 Hit—Identify an ENEMY target as an ENEMY 
 Miss—Identify an ENEMY target as a FRIENDLY 
 False Alarm—Identify a FRIENDLY target as an ENEMY 
 Correct Rejection—Identify a FRIENDLY target as a FRIENLDY 
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Participants completed a practice trial for task familiarization. The practice 
trial was divided into five blocks, each containing 10 targets to be identified. 
During the practice trials, participants were informed that the first two targets of 
each block were always friendly and the second two were always enemy. When 
a participant used the keyboard to identify a target, an identification marker was 
recorded on a two-dimensional video map. The target markers and target 
location were combined to determine hits, misses, false alarms and correct 
rejections. At the end of each block, the researcher assessed performance with 
the participant by reviewing the map.  
All participants began the experiment with the manual control trial. 
Participants were directed to identify targets, but they were not given the aid of 
an automated identification system. The trial contained 100 targets divided into 
five blocks of 20 targets. Each block contained an equal number of friendly and 
enemy targets. At the completion of a block the simulation was paused and the 
participant received feedback about the number of hits, correct rejections, false 
alarms, and misses. 
Upon completion of the manual control scenario participants were given a 
new set of instructions. The instructions informed the participants that the 
unmanned aircraft had been upgraded with an automated identification system. 
The description of the automated identification system was dependent on the 
participant’s experimental group. See Appendix C for the complete instructions 
given to the experimental groups. During the second and third trials, targets were 
identified by red arrows to indicate enemies and blue arrows to indicate 
friendlies. The participants completed one trial at 75% automation accuracy and 
a second trial at 90% automation accuracy. Each trial contained 100 targets, 
divided into five blocks of 20 targets. Each block contained an equal number of 
friendly and enemy targets. At the completion of a block the simulation was 
paused and the participant received feedback about the number of hits, correct 
rejections, false alarms, and misses.  
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At the completion of the second trial, participants were asked two 
questions. Responses to these questions were used to determine perceived 
reliability and perceived utility of the automated system. The questions were 
repeated at the end of the third trial as well. Perceived reliability was assessed by 
the following question:  
In the previous scenario, you were presented with 100 targets. 
Please estimate the percentage of times the automation was 
correct in its identification of individuals? 
Perceived utility was assessed by the second question, which was 
presented as follows: 
If you were asked to scout an additional roadway would you prefer 
to identify and report targeting information without the use of the 
automated system or would you prefer to allow the automated 


















The present study collected target identification data from participants that 
performed an identification task. The number of hits, misses, false alarms, and 
correct rejections were determined by comparison between the true target type 
and identified target type. Analysis was performed to determine the effect of 
automation accuracy, type of target, and level of automation on ability to correctly 
identify targets. An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests. 
1. Level of Automation 
The present study examined correct identification percentage at three 
levels of automation. Participants were placed into one of three groups and 
experienced only a single level of automation. The number of correctly identified 
targets divided by the total number of targets was referred to as correct 
identification percentage (CIP).  The mean CIP at LOA 1, decision support, was 
88.2% (SD=18.5). Participants in LOA 2, management by consent, achieved a 
mean CIP of 96.0% (SD=5.8). The mean CIP at LOA 3, management by 
exception, was 89.9% (SD=9.8). Figure 6 presents a chart of mean correct 
identification percentage by sector and level of automation.  
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Figure 6.   Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
A one-way ANOVA was performed between CIP and LOA. A significant 
difference was detected between groups, F(2, 297)=10.84, p<.0001. Analysis of 
residuals indicated subject number 2 may have been an outlier. A Kruskal Wallis 
test confirmed the results of the one-way ANOVA, x2(2)=27.48, p<.0001. The p-
value of the ANOVA and Kruskal Wallis were the same, so the one-way ANOVA 
results were retained. Post hoc analysis of the results indicated that CIP at LOA 
2 was greater than LOA 1 and LOA 3. 
The receiver operator characteristics (ROC) of participants was also 
analyzed. Participants’ hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections were 
grouped by LOA. Sensitivity (d') was calculated within each group and the results 
were placed on a scatter plot indicating the ratio of false alarms to hits. High 
sensitivity values indicate a high number of hits in relation to false alarms. Figure 
7 depicts the ROC for each level of automation. Within a level of automation, 
sensitivity was calculated at each identification block. Figure 8 depicts the 
sensitivity across identification blocks at each LOA.  
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Figure 7.   Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
Figure 8.   Sensitivity 
A final chart was created by plotting CIP variance across zones at each 
level of automation. Variance at LOA 1, LOA 2, and LOA 3 (M=.041, .006, .016) 
did not appear to decrease across identification blocks. The plot of variance by 
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level of automation is depicted in Figure 9. Initially, the variance plots at each 
LOA did not overlap. However, two participants in LOA 1 performed far below the 
average. When their data were removed, the LOA 1 plot was very similar to the 
LOA 3 plot. The mean variance at LOA 1 dropped to 0.013. The adjusted plot of 
variance by level of automation is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9.   Variance By Level of Automation 
 
Figure 10.   Adjusted Variance By Level of Automation 
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2. Automation Accuracy 
Participants were presented with two levels of automation accuracy. One 
trial was completed at 75% accuracy and a second trial was completed at 90% 
accuracy. In the 75% accuracy condition, the mean CIP was 90.5% (SD=14.8). In 
the 90% accuracy condition, the mean CIP was 92.1% (SD=14.9). Over the 
course of one trial, participants identified targets in five sectors completed 
sequentially. Mean CIP was calculated for each sector and the values were 
plotted on a line chart. A complete experimental trial was represented by five 
connected data points, one for each sector in the trial. Figure 11 presents a chart 
of mean CIP by sector and accuracy level. 
 
Figure 11.   Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
A repeated measures one-way ANOVA was performed between CIP and 
accuracy within participants. The ANOVA results were not significant, F(1, 
269)=2.60, p=.1081. Residual analysis indicated that participant number two was 
an outlier. A Wilcoxon ranked sum test was performed and a significant 
difference between accuracy levels was detected, x2(1)=4.67, p=.03. The results 
of the ANOVA were rejected in favor of the Wilcoxon test. 
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A final chart was created by plotting the variance of the CIP across 
identification blocks at each level of accuracy. There was a great deal of overlap 
between plot of variance at the 75% level (M=.016) and the plot of variance at the 
90% level (M=.017). The chart is depicted in Figure 12. 
  
Figure 12.   Variance By Accuracy of Automation 
B. PERCIEVED RELIABILITY AND UTILITY 
Participants were asked to estimate the reliability of the automated aid 
twice. One estimate was made at the conclusion of the 75% accuracy condition 
and the second estimate was made at the conclusion of the 90% accuracy 
condition. The mean estimated accuracy of the 75% condition was 81.4% 
(SD=8.7). The mean estimated accuracy of the 90% condition was 88.8% 
(SD=6.0). No correlation was found between the participant’s total correct 
identification rate and the estimated accuracy of the automation, r(58)=.05, 
p=.08. A paired t-test was performed and the difference between accuracy 
estimates was found to be significant (t(29)=6.11, p<.0001). 
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Participants were also asked to indicate their preference for human or 
automation use in a future task. The question was asked at the end of the 75% 
and 90% accuracy trials. Participants were directed to choose between two 
responses: perform the task with no automated aid or allow the automated aid to 
perform the task without human interaction. The majority of participants (80%) 
preferred to perform the task with no automated aid. At the end of each trial, only 
three participants indicated a preference to allow the automation to completely 
control the task. Three additional participants misinterpreted the question and 
responded that they would prefer to perform the task and have the help of the 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. HYPOTHESIS ONE 
The hypothesis that increasing the level of automation would decrease the 
operator’s ability to calibrate trust was partially supported. Trust calibration was 
measured by the percentage of targets correctly identified over five identification 
sectors. A difference in correct identification percentage between levels of 
automation was expected as an indication of trust calibration. A greater 
difference in CIP would indicate a greater difference in trust calibration. In the 
first identification sector, CIP was expected to be nearly equal. In subsequent 
sectors, the difference in CIP was expected to grow. Eventually, the CIP at all 
three levels of automation would converge. The result would be a plot of three 
different curves, beginning at roughly the same level of performance and ending 
at the same level of performance. A depiction of the expected results is 
presented in Figure 13. The actual line plot of results is presented in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 13.   Expected Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
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Figure 14.   Actual Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
A comparison between the plots of expected and actual results yielded 
noticeable differences. Correct identification percentage was expected to 
increase over time as an indication that trust calibration had increased, but the 
actual CIP remained relatively constant. In addition, plots of LOA 1 and LOA 3 
overlapped on several occasions. Statistical analysis revealed that CIP at LOA 2 
was greater than CIP at LOAs 1 and 3 (p<.0001). Results of the one-way ANOVA 
and Kruskal Wallis test were equal. The difference that was detected between 
levels of automation did not fully support the hypothesis. Against expectations, 
CIP at LOA 1 was significantly less than CIP at LOA 2. This may indicate that 
differing levels of trust calibration have occurred, but not in the expected manner. 
A second indication of trust calibration was variance of the correct 
identification percentage. Smaller variance was expected to be an indication of 
better calibration with the automated system. We expected to see decreasing 
variance across sectors. In addition, as automation level increased, we expected 
to see higher variance and at each sector. A depiction of the expected results is 
presented in Figure 15. The actual variance plots is depicted in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15.   Expected Variance By Automation Level 
 
Figure 16.   Actual Variance by Level of Automation 
The expected results were not reflected in the actual variance plots. 
Though variance appeared to differ by LOA, there was no distinctive decrease in 
variance across identification sectors. The lack of change in variance across 
sectors indicates that trust calibration did not change over time. In addition, the 
similarity in variance by LOA indicates that calibration was the same at each level 
of automation. 
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The results can be viewed from three points of view. We will refer to 
Figure 17 to describe the possibilities. One explanation is that participants were 
able to calibrate their trust at LOA 2 more effectively. Correct identification 
percentage at LOA 2 was significantly higher than at the other LOAs. A higher 
correct identification percentage indicates better trust calibration. In other words, 
participants in LOA 2 had a better understanding of when to trust or distrust the 
automated system. Better calibration allowed them to recognize when the 
automated identification system accurately reflected ground truth.   
 
Figure 17.   Relationship between ground truth, automation, and decision maker 
Second, the lack of difference between LOA 1 and LOA 3. Sensitivity, the 
ratio of hits to false alarms, was very high. This suggests that participants may 
have been able to bypass the automated system and directly observe ground 
truth. Participants may have been able to make identifications based on ground 
truth with certainty.  
Third, the high level of sensitivity exhibited by participants may suggest 
the task was too easy. If the task truly was too easy, it supports the idea that 
participants bypassed the automated system and directly interpreted ground 
truth. Several factors indicated that the identification task lacked difficulty. During 
the pilot experimental design, enemy and friendly targets possessed several 
distinguishing features. Participants in the first pilot study committed nearly zero 
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false alarms and misses. In the final experimental design, different enemy and 
friendly targets were chosen in an attempt to make the task more difficult. Even 
though the differences in enemy and friendly targets were reduced, participants 
quickly learned to correctly identify targets. Participants discovered visual cues 
that aided identification. In many cases, multiple targets were visible to 
participants at the same time. This allowed them to make direct comparisons 
between targets rather than absolute judgments. The software also made enemy 
and friendly targets point their weapons at each other, which aided identification. 
Finally, the participants’ freedom to aim the video camera allowed them to dwell 
on many targets for extended lengths of time. The additional time enhanced 
identification of targets that may have been more difficult to distinguish. Any 
differences in correct identification percentage between levels of automation 
could be attributed to differences between the participant groups. Unfortunately, 
participants did not experience all three levels of automation, so this possibility 
could not be explored. 
One shortfall of this study was that participants only experience one level 
of automation. The software in use did not allow participants to see the 
automated system at work. Their only knowledge of the automated system was 
provided in pretrial instructions. The instructions described how the automated 
system would function after an identification had been made. However, those 
functions were never performed in view of the participants. As a result, it would 
have been difficult to present the participants with all three levels of automation in 
a distinguishable manner.  
Previous studies in human-automation interaction have attempted to 
measure trust in two ways. The first method was to directly question participants 
about their level of trust in the automation (Muir, 1989; Lee & Moray, 1992). 
These studies found that development of trust is a process that takes place over 
time. In addition, faults were shown to decrease trust in the system. In contrast 
with earlier work, the present study did not assess calibration of trust over time. 
Ruff, Narayanan, and Draper (2002) asked participants to report trust in systems 
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at three levels of automation. They found that participants exhibited the highest 
trust in the system when it operated at the management by consent level of 
automation.  As the number of vehicles being controlled increased, reported trust 
levels also increased. This trend was not uniform across all levels of automation. 
In the management by exception condition trust decreased as number of vehicles 
increased. Performance was also greatest in the management by consent 
condition. The management by consent condition also led to the highest 
performance in the present study. This confirms the findings of Ruff, Narayanan, 
and Draper (2002). A second method to measure trust is to examine the decision 
to rely on the automation. Dzindolet et al. (2002) reported that, when asked to 
choose, participants indicated a reluctance to allow tasks to be fully controlled by 
automated systems. Participants in the present study confirmed those results by 
electing to perform tasks manually when given the choice between full manual 
control and full automation control. 
The present study differed from previous research in that it attempted to 
measure the calibration of trust in a system over time. In previous studies, (van 
Dongen & van Maanen, 2006) calibration was indicated by a comparison 
between the estimated reliability in self and estimated reliability of automation. 
Under-trust in automated systems seemed to remain constant, but under-trust in 
self decreased from the first to second trial. Estimated trust was not collected in 
the present study, but participant performance did not change over time. This 
indicates that participant trust calibration did not change as trials progressed. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TWO 
The hypothesis that decreasing accuracy of the automation would 
decrease the operator’s ability to calibrate trust was not supported. Trust 
calibration was measured by the percentage of targets correctly identified over 
five identification blocks. We expected to see a difference in correct identification 
percentage between levels of accuracy. In the first identification block, CIP was 
expected to be nearly equal. In subsequent blocks, the difference in CIP was 
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expected to grow. The CIP at the high accuracy level would always exceed the 
CIP at low accuracy level. The result would be a plot of two curves, beginning at 
roughly the same level of performance and ending at separate levels of 
performance. A depiction of the expected results is presented in Figure 18. The 
actual line plot of results is presented in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 18.   Expected Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
 
Figure 19.   Actual Mean Correct Identification Percentage 
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The difference between CIP at 75% accuracy and 90% accuracy was 
found to be significant (p=.03). However, this finding does not support the 
hypothesis that trust calibration was greater at the higher level of accuracy. At 
the 75% accuracy level, participants were presented with 25 incorrectly identified 
targets. In the 75% condition, participants were able to identify 90.5% of targets 
correctly. However, 25% percent of the total targets were incorrectly identified by 
the automated system. This means that participants correctly recognized the 
error in the automated system 62% of the time. In the 90% accuracy condition, 
participants were able to identify 92.1% of the targets correctly. With 10% of the 
targets identified incorrectly by the automated system, the participants correctly 
recognized errors by the automated system 21% of the time. The difference in 
correct recognition of automated errors may indicate better trust calibration in the 
75% condition.  
A second indication of trust calibration was the variance of CIP across 
identification blocks. Smaller variance was an indication of increased calibration 
with the automated system. We expected to see decreasing variance across 
identification blocks. In addition, at the high accuracy level, we expected to see 
less variance at each identification sector. A depiction of the expected results is 
presented in Figure 20. The actual variance plot is depicted in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 20.   Expected Variance By Accuracy of Automation 
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Figure 21.   Actual Variance By Accuracy of Automation 
The expected results were not reflected in the actual variance plots. The 
high accuracy variance plot consistently overlapped the low accuracy variance 
plot. In addition, there was no pattern of decreasing variance over time. Neither 
of the expected characteristics of the chart (decreasing variance and differing 
variance by accuracy) were present. The comparison of variance over time does 
not support the hypothesis that trust calibration will decrease with automation 
accuracy. 
Participants were aware of differing accuracy levels. The matched pairs t-
test of estimated accuracy indicated participants could distinguish the accuracy 
levels (p<.0001). This implies that participants knew when the automated system 
was incorrect and consistently disregarded the system’s inputs. However, it does 
not support the hypothesis that trust calibration would be lower for less accurate 
systems. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that changes in automation accuracy 
lead to changes in operator performance. Ruff, Narayanan, and Draper (2002) 
demonstrated that a decrease from 100% accuracy to 95% accuracy reduced 
operator efficiency from 76% to 69%. The present study confirmed the 
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relationship between accuracy and performance. However, trust calibration did 
not decrease with accuracy. Not all research has supported the results of Ruff, 
Narayanan, and Draper. Sorkin and Woods (1985) found that optimizing the 
performance of an automated system did not always yield the best results for the 
human-automation team. 
Some have argued that levels of automation is not an effective way to 
describe human-automation interactions. The concept of “Levels of Automation” 
effectively explains the division of tasks between humans and automation, but it 
may not describe the way humans interact cognitively with automated systems. 
As Dekker and Woods (2002) point out, lists like Sheridan and Verplank’s (1978) 
Levels of Automation do not describe the cognitive processes that are involved in 
deciding how to use an automated system. It is possible that humans evaluate 
the trustworthiness of an automated system without considering its level of 
automation. In other words, after an error, trust in a system with high automation 
will change at the same rate as trust in a system with low automation. Humans 
may simply see an automated system that is making errors. 
The present study does not support the claims of Dekker and Woods 
(2002). Significant differences in correct identification percentage by level of 
automation and accuracy were detected. These differences imply that LOA and 
accuracy affect the ability to calibrate trust in automated systems. However, 
differences in performance remained constant over time. Relatively constant 
performance may be explained by very high performance levels. The participants 
may have found the task to be too easy. If the task truly was too easy then 
participants may have disregarded the automated system or failed to use it as 
intended. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The employment of automated systems is expanding across the modern 
battlefield. The growth of automation has not eliminated the human from the 
system; it has transformed the human’s role. With the trend toward increasing 
level of automation, humans have changed from operators to supervisors. This 
change does not necessarily mean that human workload has been reduced. 
Instead, cognitive resources are applied to different tasks, such as anticipating 
the automation and understanding the actions of the automation. Nonetheless, 
highly automated systems will be critical for the supervision of multiple 
unmanned systems across the battlefield.  
The changing but continuous role that humans maintain with automated 
systems requires an understanding of the human-automation relationship. One 
aspect of this relationship that had not yet been fully explored was the process by 
which humans calibrate trust in automated systems. In the present study, 
participants were given the assistance of an automated system for the 
identification of enemy and friendly targets. Participants were placed in three 
groups and provided with information about the responsibilities of the automation. 
The descriptions corresponded to one of three levels of automation: decision 
support, management by consent, and management by exception. In addition, 
the participants experienced two levels of automation accuracy, 75% and 90%. 
Two hypotheses were proposed. The first hypothesis, that a high level of 
automation would decrease the ability to calibrate trust was partially supported. 
In addition, the second hypothesis, that low automation accuracy would decrease 
the ability to calibrate trust was not supported. 
The results of this study suggest that a system’s level of automation may 
influence an operator’s ability to calibrate trust. Participants who had been told 
they were using automation that employed management by consent 
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outperformed those using decision support and management by exception levels 
of automation. Better performance may indicate better trust calibration, but not in 
the direction hypothesized. The accuracy of the automated system also 
influenced the correct identification percentage. Performance was better at the 
90% accuracy level but a greater percentage of automation errors were identified 
at the 75% accuracy level. We hypothesized that trust calibration would decrease 
as accuracy decreased, but trust calibration appeared to increase as accuracy 
decreased. 
The difference in performance between levels of automation could also be 
explained by the experimental design. Subjects only experienced a single level of 
automation, so we don’t know if their performance would be equal across levels. 
An additional limitation of the experiment was the ease of distinguishing enemy 
and friendly personnel. Participants were better at identifying targets than the 
automated system. As a result, participants may not have used the automated 
system as expected. Several participants stated that the automation was helpful 
in finding the location of targets, but the friend or foe indications were ignored 
because the participant may have believed he or she was more accurate. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Research in the area of trust and levels of automation is relatively new. 
There are many opportunities to expand our understanding of the human-
automation relationship. Future research into levels of automation would certainly 
benefit from greater automation functionality. An automated system with more 
fidelity, that allows participants to see the outcome of their decisions may create 
a more noticeable difference in the levels of automation experienced. It would 
also allow a repeated measures design for more effective statistical analysis. 
Future experiments should be designed with a more difficult task for participants. 
Measurement of trust and trust calibration would be more effective if the 
participants actually needed to rely on the automated system. 
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In the course of the present study, some additional questions were 
developed. Previous studies found that humans often choose not to rely on 
automated systems (Dzindolet et al., 2002). One direction for future research 
would be to focus on the human’s decision to rely on automated systems. At 
what degree of difference between human and automation performance will 
humans prefer to rely on the automated system? Will that preference vary by 
level of automation? 
Another direction for research should look at alternate methods for 
measuring trust calibration. The present study equated percent of targets 
correctly identified to proper calibration. However, many participants reported 
using the automated system in a manner other than intended. These participants 
used the automated system to point to the location of targets, but ignored the 
target type indicated by the automated system. Since the participants knew to 
trust their own judgment, one might assume they were properly calibrated all 
along. This implies that a better indication of trust calibration may be the 
participant’s knowledge of when to trust and when to distrust the automated 
system. Many automated systems have reliabilities that change as the conditions 
and environment change. A human that knows when to trust and when to distrust 
the automated system is highly calibrated. Simply achieving a high number of 
correct answers may not indicate high calibration.  
An understanding of the cognitive processes in play on a human-
automation team is vital to the future integration of highly automated systems 
onto the battlefield. We must examine the manner in which humans build trust in 
automated systems and how trust relates to effective operation. The real goal of 
future research should not be to divide the tasks between humans and machines; 
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APPENDIX A. POST-TRIAL QUESTIONNAIRES 
Post-Trial 2 Questions 
 
In the previous scenario you were presented with 100 targets. Please estimate 
the percentage of times the automation was correct in its identification of 
individuals.  _________________ 
 
 
If you were to perform this task in the future would you prefer to execute the 












Post-Trial 3 Questions 
 
In the previous scenario you were presented with 100 targets. Please estimate 
the percentage of times the automation was correct in its identification of 
individuals.  _________________ 
 
 
If you were to perform this task in the future would you prefer to execute the 
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APPENDIX B.  DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
This experiment is designed to explore what people think about automation. By 
automation, we mean devices and systems that make work or other tasks easier for you to 
do. Examples of automation are: Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers you might 
have in your car, handheld electronic organizers, or military applications such as 
























I prefer to never      I prefer to use automation 
use automation        whenever possible 
In you military job 
 
In your time at NPS 
 
 58
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 59
APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
INITIAL INSRUCTIONS 
 
There has been a recent increase in terrorist activities along a road of strategic 
importance. Little is known about the position of enemy and friendly personnel 
along the roadway. In order to collect intelligence on the disposition of forces an 
unmanned aircraft has been directed to scout the roadway. You are the operator 
of the unmanned aircraft video feed. The aircraft will fly a programmed route over 
the roadway while you manipulate the camera. When you encounter an enemy 
along the route press the key labeled E to indicate an enemy, the target will be 
destroyed when the aircraft has passed. When you encounter friendlies along the 
route, press the key labeled “F” to keep them safe from engagement.  
 
 





Decision Support—Trial 1 
 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout another roadway for enemy 
and friendly personnel. Since your last mission the sensor package has been 
upgraded with an automated identification system. The system compiles visual 
indications and additional sensor data then indicates the possible presence of 
enemy or friendly units. As the operator, you must evaluate the video feed and 
the indications of the automated identification system to mark enemy and friendly 
personnel. Your own inputs, using the “E” (enemy) and “F” (friendly) keys will 
ultimately determine which units are to be engaged. 
 
   
 
Decision Support—Trial 2 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout a third roadway for enemy and 
friendly personnel. As the operator, you must once again evaluate the video feed 
and the indications of the automated identification system to mark enemy and 
friendly personnel. Your own inputs, using the “E” (enemy) and “F” (friendly) keys 





Management by Consent—Trial 1 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout another roadway for enemy 
and friendly personnel. Since your last mission the sensor package has been 
upgraded with an automated identification system. The system compiles visual 
indications and additional sensor data, and then determines if a unit is enemy or 
friendly. Identified personnel will be indicated on the video feed. The system will 
autonomously direct the engagement of enemy targets and mark friendly units for 
safety.  As the operator, you must provide consent before the automated system 
will transmit target information. Evaluate the video feed and the indications of the 
automated identification system to make your determination and provide consent 
by using the “E” (enemy) and “F” (friendly) keys. When you disagree with the 
automation please mark the target in the appropriate manner. If you do not mark 
a target or provide consent, no enemy or friendly information will be passed. 
 
 
   
 
Management by Consent—Trial 2  
 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout a third roadway for enemy and 
friendly personnel. The system will autonomously direct the engagement of 
enemy targets and mark friendly units for safety.  As the operator, you must 
provide consent before the automated system will transmit target information. 
Evaluate the video feed and the indications of the automated identification 
system to make your determination and provide consent by using the “E” 
(enemy) and “F” (friendly) keys. When you disagree with the automation please 
mark the target in the appropriate manner. If you do not mark a target or provide 
consent, no enemy or friendly information will be passed. 
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Management by Exception—Trial 1 
 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout another roadway for enemy 
and friendly personnel. Since your last mission the sensor package has been 
upgraded with an automated identification system. The system compiles visual 
indications and additional sensor data, and then determines if a unit is enemy or 
friendly. Identified personnel will be indicated on the video feed. The system will 
autonomously direct the engagement of enemy targets and mark friendly units for 
safety.  As the operator, you have the ability to veto the automated system. 
Without a veto, the targeting information will be transmitted. Evaluate the video 
feed and the indications of the automated identification system to make your 
determination. You may veto the automation by pressing the “D” (disagree) key 
and agree with the automation by pressing the “A” (agree) key. 
 
   
 
Management by Exception—Trial 2 
 
Your unmanned aircraft has been tasked to scout a third roadway for enemy and 
friendly personnel. Since your last mission the sensor package has been 
upgraded with an automated identification system. The system compiles visual 
indications and additional sensor data, and then determines if a unit is enemy or 
friendly. Identified personnel will be indicated on the video feed. The system will 
autonomously direct the engagement of enemy targets and mark friendly units for 
safety.  As the operator, you have the ability to veto the automated system. 
Without a veto, the targeting information will be transmitted. Evaluate the video 
feed and the indications of the automated identification system to make your 
determination. You may veto the automation by pressing the “D” (disagree) key 
and agree with the automation by pressing the “A” (agree) key. 
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